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Cross-Currents of Pragmatism and Pragmatics: 
A Sociological Perspective on Practices and Forms 
 
Piet Strydom 
Department of Sociology 
School of Sociology and Philosophy 




Introduction: The Metaproblematic of Pragmatism 
 
My brief in this article is to clarify the relations between pragmatism and pragmatics from a 
contemporary sociological perspective. To begin with, it should be noted that these two words are 
closely related. Not only do they derive from the same etymological root, but they also stem from 
the same philosophical source. 
 
Etymologically, both pragmatism and pragmatics derive from the Greek word pragma (πράγμα) 
meaning deed, act, enterprise, doing, acting and so forth. Philosophically, their most immediate 
source is Peirce, but the name of Kant also needs to be mentioned in this regard. As the founder of a 
unique American philosophy, Peirce coined the word ‘pragmatism’ in the early 1870s to denote this 
new departure. However, due to some of his followers’ tampering with this position, particularly 
James, he later chose to rename his approach ‘pragmaticism’ instead – which he said was ugly 
enough to be safe from kidnappers. He admitted that he owed his inspiration for the name of his 
philosophy to Kant whom he regarded as having been his philosophical mother’s milk. To 
understand pragmatism or pragmaticism, therefore, one cannot avoid having at least some recourse 
to Kant’s fundamental innovation, what he himself regarded as his Copernican revolution. 
 
As far as the word ‘pragmatics’ is concerned, Morris introduced it in the 1930s in the context of the 
philosophy of language. Of this neologism he said that it was coined with reference to the term 
pragmatism. In fact, he depended on Pierce whom he highly respected, particularly on his semiotic 
theory of the three-dimensional sign which is essential to grasping the process dimension of 
pragmatism. In Morris’ terminology, pragmatics represents one of these three dimensions, the 
others being syntax and semantics. 
 
Despite their common etymological and philosophical sources, however, the relations between 
pragmatism and pragmatics are rather complex. One consideration alone that already accounts for 
this complexity is that there are different versions of both of these intellectual positions and, hence, 
a variety of different relations which have developed between them over a relatively long period of 
time. To obtain an adequate understanding of this complexity, therefore, a sufficiently 
comprehensive and differentiated perspective is required. In order to facilitate the acquisition of 
such an understanding, one would be well advised in my view to keep in mind what may be called 
the metaproblematic of pragmatism. The question is: What precisely is generally at stake in the 
process that gave rise to and underpinned the development of the different versions of pragmatism 
and pragmatics? What is the overarching issue or problematic, meta-theoretically speaking? One 
way in which this matter can be made visible is to focus on the logic of the whole development from 
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From the logic of the development of pragmatism it should be apparent that the metaproblematic 
amounts to this: that pragmatism, including pragmatics, is above all about moving beyond the 
limitations of empiricism or positivism in order to deal with what is implied by the relation between 
pragma (action or praxis) and form or, in contemporary social-theoretical language, between 
practices and sociocultural forms. What Figure 1 suggests is that at the different stages under 
historically specific conditions, not only pragma and form were both understood in distinct ways, but 
also the relation between them has been conceived in variably unique senses. To approximate an 
adequate grasp of the cross-currents of pragmatism and pragmatics, therefore, demands that close 
attention be paid to these differences and variations. In the following paragraphs, accordingly, the 
argument is unfolded in terms of the metaproblematic of pragmatism, while allowing it to be guided 
by the logical steps in its development from the late eighteenth century to contemporary sociology. 
 
 
1 From Empiricism to Pragmatism 
 
Peirce: pragmatism 
As early as 1871, Charles Sanders Peirce suggested a tentative version of what became known as his 
‘pragmatic maxim’, but it was not until some years later, after having founded pragmatism in 1877-
78, that he was able to give it a definitive formulation (1992: 131). According to him, the acceptance 
of this maxim constitutes pragmatism. In a dictionary entry dating from 1902 on pragmatism he 
repeated this formulation: ‘Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole 
of our conception of the object’ (1960: paragraph 5.2). While he immediately added that he was led 
to this maxim by reflection on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, he also invoked Kant’s Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View, thus giving an indication of the source of the name he chose for his 
philosophy and maxim. As signalling a unique approach, pragmatism represents an onslaught against 
nominalist empiricism or positivism, the precedent for with is to be found in Kant. Empiricism or 
positivism simply settles for the direct observational empirical experience of a positively given 
object. By contrast, Peirce insists on taking into account that the object, far from simply being 
positively given, is rather constituted by a general concept and, further, that we fully understand the 
object only once we have worked out all the possible practical effects or consequences 
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accommodated by this general conception. Instead of mere empirical experience obtained through 
direct observation, therefore, he appeals to the mediation of such experience by recourse to 
possible experience, as stressed by Kant. In other words, Peirce sees the object in relation to its 
form, and also the action or practice of engaging with the object in relation to the form of that 
action or practice. To allude to Kant’s example, to be able to identify a particular dog as a dog at all 
presupposes that one has a general concept of dog; and depending on whether the particular dog is 
engaged with as a pet or as a working sniffer, the general concept would in each case be filled out by 
a range of very different possibilities of how the relation to and the activities undertaken with the 
dog could be understood and organized. 
 
Kant: transcendentalism 
In the formulation of his pragmatism, Peirce drew on what Immanuel Kant (1968), in analogy to 
Copernicus’ shift from the Ptolemaic to the heliocentric view of planet earth, regarded as his 
Copernican revolution. This radical innovation can be regarded as having two aspects. In the first 
place, it required the introduction of his transcendental approach which stressed the 
acknowledgement of the necessary and unavoidable presuppositions, the a priori, of thought and 
action. For instance, to have an object in respect of which knowledge can be obtained, presupposes 
an antecedent grasp of objects of possible experience – that is, something a priori, ideas of reason 
and categories which enable us beforehand to formally identify objects. Demanding that form be 
taken into account, this approach thus entailed the reversal of the traditional relation between 
knowledge and object. Instead of our knowledge being directed and guided by our knowledge 
object, the object should follow our rationally, categorically directed and guided cognition. It should 
be noted, however, that this reversal did not mean that Kant embraced rationalism instead of 
empiricism. To the same degree that he sought to go beyond empiricism, while nevertheless 
retaining empirical knowledge of objects, he also distanced himself from his own rationalist origins. 
In the second place, therefore, he rejected the traditional ideal of pure theory. For this reason, he 
reversed also the traditional relation between theory and practice. Although the shift from the 
object to general concepts meant that theory was effectively given priority over objects, Kant 
nevertheless stressed that henceforth theory makes sense only within practice. Theory is in principle 
theory within the framework of practice. Virtually alone amongst the Enlightenment thinkers, 
moreover, Kant took seriously the fact that reason could harbour groundless pretensions and be 
delusive and self-destructive. This accounts for why he made the critique of reason itself the core 
component of his transcendental philosophy. 
 
Kant’s Copernican revolution was decisive for Peirce in arriving at the idea of pragmatism. This is 
evident from his dictionary article referred to above. He did not just react against empiricism or 
positivism by stressing the importance of general concepts or form, but he actually framed the 
dictionary entry as a whole by reference to Kant’s understanding of the word ‘pragmatic’. The 
opening sentence reads: ‘Pragmatic anthropology, according to Kant, is practical ethics. Pragmatic 
horizon is the adaptation of our general knowledge to influencing our morals’ (Peirce 1960: 5.1). In 
other words, our general knowledge, theory or reasoning is ultimately in the service of contributing 
to the creation of a proper human world, one in which truth, rightness and authenticity prevail. For 
Peirce, this meant that pragmatism and the pragmatic maxim are about contributing to the 
development of what he called ‘concrete reasonableness’ (1960: 5.3) – that is, participating 
responsibly in social and natural evolution by contributing to the development of clear ideas and 
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2 Pragma in Relation to Form 
 
Action and praxis 
Although pragmatism was basically rooted in Kant’s philosophy, Peirce understood 
transcendentalism in a deflated sense in the wake of Hegel’s (1967) historical transformation of 
Kant. Rather than just unhistorical, abstract, formal presuppositions underpinning thought and 
action, Hegel’s idealism entailed that ideas, such as for example mind, freedom or the state, were 
located within the historical process where they themselves orchestrated the unfolding of their own 
actualization and realization. While Peirce followed this historical deflation of transcendentalism, he 
objected that Hegel’s idealism was marred by ignoring reality – a dimension that pragmatism must 
cover. Peirce’s pragmatic transformation of Kantian transcendentalism thus paralleled Karl Marx’s 
(1967) earlier materialist transformation of Kantian-Hegelian idealism. The difference in emphasis 
between these two contemporaries is evident, however, from their distinct understandings of 
pragma. Whereas Marx (1967: 400) stressed ‘praxis’ in the sense of revolutionary world 
transformation, Peirce (1992: 129, 1998: 499) put his faith in ‘action’ in the sense of problem-solving 
and responsible world-creation. 
 
Form: general ideas and historically accumulated potentialities 
Like Marx when he turned Hegel from standing on his head back onto his feet, Peirce also 
emphasized the importance of human beings as actors or agents who establish relations to the 
world and engage with its various dimensions. But for neither of them was it simply a matter of 
engagement with the world and praxis or action alone or the practical facts thus produced. In 
keeping with Kant and Hegel, the ideas that not just direct and guide pragma but simultaneously 
also constitute and regulate the very context of praxis and action must be included as well. In other 
words, both pragma and its form need to be taken into account at one and the same time. We have 
already seen that pragmatism for Peirce turns in Kantian fashion on general concepts or, as he said, 
‘general ideas as the true interpreters of our thought’ (1960: 5.3). It is in this vein that he criticized 
James’ popular rendition of pragmatism. Far from being based on the assumption that ‘action is the 
end of man’, pragmatism rather recognizes that ‘action wants an end, and that that end must be 
something of a general description’ such as, for example, ‘concrete reasonableness’ as ‘the ultimate 
good’ of action (1960: 5.3). On numerous occasions, he also stressed the importance of such ideas as 
truth, right and beauty. In fact, in Peirce’s view, ideas such as these have a power of finding or 
creating their own vehicles and of conferring upon such vehicles the ability to transform the face of 
the earth: ‘…without the influence of ideas there is no potentiality’ (1998: 121). Some years before 
Peirce, Marx (1967) developed a comparable position which has attained the status of the most 
basic principle of left-Hegelianism, namely: historically, a set of rational potentialities has 
accumulated, including for example an idea such as an equal, associational and solidary society, 
which encourage human beings to actualize those very potentialities in an attempt to realize them 
as fully as possible under the new historical conditions and thereby to transform the world for the 
better. 
 
The conclusion follows, then, that action and praxis, or practices of all kinds, must in principle be 
regarded within the context constituted by their form. 
 
Peirce’s pragmatist architectonic 
As for Peirce’s understanding of such a contextualizing form, it should be noted that he insisted that 
pragmatism represents an ‘architectonic construction’ (1960: 5.5) embracing a number of different 
dimensions. This framework specifies the minimum of essential components, the most basic 
elements of which he regarded as ‘indecomposable’ (1998: 425). First, at the centre of the 
architectonic is the pragmatic maxim as a mode of thought geared toward preparing for action by 
comprehensively clarifying the end of action, but it is embedded in a number of progressively 
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broader and deeper dimensions making the pragmatic mode of thought, analysis and practices 
possible. Second, the ability to determine the kind of action required to be taken by clarifying its 
end, as we have seen earlier, calls for general concepts. Such general concepts must obviously be 
concretely specifiable and directly relevant to the action situation in question if they were to direct 
and guide thought and action. On the one hand, such general concepts contain concretely realizable 
possibilities and, on the other, their directing and guiding function implies that they possess 
normative force. By contrast with this dimension delineating meaning possibilities and having a 
regulative function within the situation, the third broadest and deepest level harbours the range of 
potentialities and limits that constitute the situation in the first place and hence far exceed or 
transcend it, although remaining rooted in it since they are the potentialities and limits of that 
situation. Peirce conceived this level as a meaningful categorical dimension in order to signal that it 
consists of two closely intertwined aspects. At bottom, there are three a priori, formal, universal 
categories of experience – ‘Firstness’, ‘Secondness’ and ‘Thirdness’ (1992: 247, 1998: 233) – that 
indicate how things might be supposed to be and is ultimately justified by pure mathematics. But 
then the content of these formal categories has to be filled in, something accomplished by what 
Peirce at first called ‘phenomenology’ and later ‘phaneroscopy’ (1998: 145, 403). In this case, he 
took cues from examples of universal categories, namely, Kant’s ‘quality’, ‘relation’ and ‘modality’ 
and Hegel’s ‘immediacy’, ‘struggle’ and ‘reconciliation’, to arrive at his own ‘Quality of feeling’, 
‘Reaction’ and finally ‘Representation’ in the sense of generalizing mediation (1998: 160). With these 
phenomenologically or phaneroscopically filled universal categories we are touching on the formal, 
meaningful presuppositions necessarily and unavoidably made by all those belonging to any 
situation. With reference to Kant, Peirce and Husserl’s respective conceptions of transcendentalism, 
this dimension can be regarded as the transcendental structure of the situation or world, in which 
case it can be describe as containing the blueprints or design principles for constructing a possible 
world. 
 
Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology 
The mention of Edmund Husserl here is in order since, by returning to Kant to reinvestigate the 
problem of transcendental logic, he managed in an innovative move to secure the phenomenological 
sense of this contextualizing form which resonates with Peirce’s phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 
Husserl started from pragma abstracted into what he called ‘intentionality’ which on investigation 
turned out to be an orientation that presupposes the establishment of a relation to the world. From 
this he concluded that ‘the stream of mental processes can never consist of just actualities’ (1950: 
paragraph 35) but must at the same time embrace also potentialities. Intentionality as actuality 
always and everywhere correlates with potentiality in the form of what he called ‘eidetic’ or 
‘noematic’ structures, ‘formations of meaning’, ‘idealities’ (1969: 242, 245, 262), ‘field of unities’, 
‘validity unities’ or ‘world’ (1950: 137, 70). These represent the horizon of meaning, the continually 
shifting ‘horizon of determinable indeterminacy’ (1950: 101) within which we always inextricably 
find ourselves situated, which defines Husserl’s new version of phenomenological 
transcendentalism. The crux of his innovation, it should be noted, was to disclose the double status 
of the world. As in the case of Kant’s pragmatic horizon, the phenomenological horizon suggests a 
circular closure of reference. Here, however, it was not theory and knowledge referring to human 
concerns, but rather meaning referring to further meaning – that is, actualized meaning in a 
situation referring to potential meaning beyond the situation. Accordingly, the world has a double 
status. Humans are in the world yet they simultaneously appeal to the world as the ultimate horizon 
of meaning; the world simultaneously contains itself and transcends itself. This implies that actuality 
and the potentiality it presupposes and refers to must both be attended to at one and the same 
time. This accounts for Husserl’s insistence on the need for what he called ‘continuously two-sided 
research’ (1969: 263, 37). By the way, his successor Martin Heidegger followed this same line by on 
the one hand introducing what he called ‘being-in-the-world’ (1967: 149), interestingly elaborated 
by actually borrowing from pragmatism, and on the other stressing the ‘history of Being’ (1975: 1) in 
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the sense of the presupposed yet essentially uncontrollable higher-level happening of meaning. 
Unlike Peirce, however, Husserl and especially Heidegger moved too strongly in an idealistic 
direction. 
 
Particular meaning possibilities and formal combination potentialities 
As will become graphically apparent in due course, the distinctions and relations among the different 
dimensions of Peirce’s pragmatist architectonic are of the greatest importance for grasping the 
philosophical and social scientific significance of pragmatism and pragmatics. Particularly crucial is to 
appreciate the distinction between the dimension of general concepts necessary for the clarification 
of the ends of action and the transcendental formal-meaningful or categorical-phenomenological set 
of conditions making it possible. In the former case, we have the meaning possibilities available in a 
particular situation. In the latter, by contrast, we are concerned with the meaningful formal or 
logical combination potentialities which are the conditions of possibility of a situation or, more 
generally, of a given world as such. This distinction is important, even decisive, as Peirce’s 
pragmatism which depends on it demonstrates. The differences between distinct versions of 
pragmatism and, indeed, between divergent types of sociology which are in some sense informed by 
pragmatism can be traced to whether or not they observe this basic distinction in their respective 
conceptions of the form of practices. 
 
 
3 Varieties of Pragmatism 
In 1898, having publicly acknowledged Peirce as its originator, James embarked on a popularization 
drive of pragmatism which gave it momentum in the United States as well as resonance in an 
international debate which lasted until 1914, the year of Peirce’s death and the start of the First 
World War. Although James himself represented an existential version, the debate was largely 
focused on a utilitarian interpretation of pragmatism. In the interwar period, pragmatism’s uptake 
was strengthened by its fusion with the classical republican tradition which animated the American 
political context with its ideal of democratic communal self-organization. This context fostered the 
appearance of varieties of pragmatism possessing social scientific and political relevance, thus 
confirming that pragmatism is by no means a unified school. Considered from the metaproblematic 
perspective, it is evident that these varieties differ from one another on the basis of the divergent 
ways in which they conceive not only pragma but especially also its contextualizing form. 
 
James: subjective-psychological pragmatism 
William James (1978), a psychologist, confined pragmatism to subjective experience in particular 
contexts of situated action in which practical events served as a test for ideas. It represented a 
translation of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim directly into the practice of everyday life which 
foreshortened general ideas to particular actions and conceivable practical consequences to 
psychological effects. This served the entirely defensible purpose of dealing with pressing individual 
existential problems, but the fact that James did not always present his arguments with the 
necessary care created the impression of a utilitarian variety of pragmatism. This interpretation was 
strengthened by the availability in the international context of Nietzsche’s notorious definition of 
truth and its echoing in close contact with James by F. C. S. Schiller (1903), the most prominent 
British pragmatist of the time who opposed democracy, promoted eugenics and lauded fascism. 
According to Nietzsche, who scorned general concepts, ‘Truth is the kind of error without which a 
certain species of life could not live. The value for life is ultimately decisive’ (1968, Aphorism 493). 
Not only Peirce criticized James both privately and publicly for his actionist and subjectivist reduction 
of practice and form, but an international reaction levelled an objection against the tendency to 
reduce truth to individual self-interest and utility. Among the critics was Emile Durkheim who 
delivered a course of lectures in the winter semester of 1913-14 under the title of ‘Pragmatism and 
Sociology’ (1983). 
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Mead and Dewey: sociological pragmatism 
Mead and Dewey both transferred pragmatism, originally founded by a philosophizing natural 
scientist, to the social sciences. By contrast with James’ subjectivist version, they represented a 
more sociological one. 
 
George Herbert Mead developed what turned out to be the classical theory of symbolically 
mediated social interaction in which communicative action and interaction take place in an 
expansive form. At the first level, he identifies a vital general concept that enters and regulates the 
experience, thinking and action of the members: ‘The organized community or social group which 
gives to the individual his unity of self may be called “the generalized other”’ (1974: 154). Then on 
the second higher level beyond the community or group, he locates such universal ideas as 
‘democracy’, ‘universal discourse’ and a ‘universal human society’ (1974: 281, 327, 310). With this 
differentiated understanding of the form of social action, Mead maintained a closer relation to 
Peirce’s deflated Kantian transcendentalism than his colleague and friend Dewey did. 
 
In the wake of the post-First World War industrial-capitalist transformation of America which 
rendered classical republicanism increasingly ineffective, John Dewey made a remarkable 
contribution by focusing on the regeneration of democracy, supported by writings on ethics and 
education. In a number of important works, he elaborated a theory of the communicative 
organization and self-control of the community in which he gave a central role both to the 
participating public and to social inquiry as part of the democratic resolution of collective problems. 
However, the limits of his position on the form of democratic communication are evident from these 
very works. In The Public and Its Problems (1927), the collective engagement sustaining the process 
of problem-solving is subject to self-regulation strictly in terms of collective standards generated 
internally to the process itself, the most general idea being that of communicatively enabled 
cooperative self-governance. In a study of logic in the service of developing his theory of inquiry – 
indeed, the first systematic attempt at ‘pragmatic’ logic since Peirce – he formally confirmed his 
rather narrow acceptance of what he himself called ‘forms’ (Dewey 1939: iii). Logical forms arise 
strictly only from within the operation of inquiry itself, implying that there are no relevant universal 
categories – e.g. validity or truth – beyond inquiry. The rationality of logic is exclusively a matter of 
the relation between means and consequences. It is conceptions such as this that account for the 
widespread, yet not entirely justified, criticism of Dewey as an instrumentalist. It should be noted 
that this particular conception of logic is the exact opposite of Peirce’s view which accords social 
significance to logic: ‘Logic is rooted in the social principle’ (Peirce 1992: 149). But what is 
particularly remarkable is that besides traditional and his own pragmatic logic, Dewey’s study 
contains no reference to the significant modern development from Kant’s transcendental logic to 
Husserl’s endeavour to lay a new foundation for logic. 
 
Mills: critical sociological pragmatism 
In his early writings in which he incorporated pragmatism in a sociological approach, C. Wright Mills 
(1964) started from Peirce’s pragmatic maxim but simultaneously depended heavily also on Dewey. 
Despite this dependence, however, his conception of the form of social action and communication is 
considerably different from the latter’s. He actually attacked what he regarded as Dewey’s nakedly 
utilitarian scheme and undertook to correct it by stressing the intrinsically social character of the 
motives driving action. In his famous late work, The Sociological Imagination, he unmistakably still 
adhered to this same approach. Stressing the need to bear in mind the framework of society as a 
whole, he here sketched the task of the sociologist as being the identification of socially and 
politically significant problems manifested both as ‘personal troubles of milieu’ and as ‘public issues 
of social structure’ (1970: 14) and their critical analysis with reference to their moral substance. This 
latter requirement reveals Mills’ sense of form possessing motivational and social relevance. 
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Problem situations are not structured solely by general concepts directly relevant to the socio-
political problem at issue or by criteria generated in the struggle over them, but more importantly 
still also by what he called ’master symbols of legitimation’ (1970: 46). And to this he sagaciously 
added: ‘the relations of such symbols to the structure of institutions are among the most important 
problems in social science’. Among such symbols he singled out the situation-transcendent ideas of 
freedom and reason. For Mills, their significance resides in the fact that such forms are not only used 
for the justification of the status quo, often by obfuscating, manipulative and repressive means, but 
also serve as a basis for questioning and criticizing the organization of power and related positions. 
 
It should be obvious, to reiterate, that the marked differences between distinct varieties of 
pragmatism can be attributed to how they conceive of pragma – individual utilitarian action, 
individual existential action, communicative action, symbolically mediated social action or 
communication – and whether or not they observe in their respective conceptions of the form of 
practices the basic distinction between immanent situation-bound and situation-transcendent 
criteria. 
 
Although pragmatism after its developmental spurt between the 1890s and 1930s continued to have 
some small influence in the philosophy of science and in symbolic interactionism, it had gone into 
decline from the 1930s due to the ascendancy of analytical philosophy and the changed conditions 
ushered in by the Second World War. For decades, consequently, it languished in the doldrums in 
American universities. It is only since the 1970s that what in the 1990s came to be called ‘the 
renaissance of pragmatism’ is observable, in large part due to Apel and Habermas’ earlier innovative 
reception of Peirce’s pragmatism and to the efforts of American scholars like Richard Bernstein, 
Richard Rorty and, more recently, Robert Brandom to revive it. 
 
 
4 From Behaviouristic or Empirical to Transcendental or Formal Pragmatics 
 
It is only with Morris’ books, Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938) and Signs, Language, and 
Behaviour (1946), giving evidence of his appropriation of Peirce, that the cross-currents of 
pragmatism and pragmatics were unleashed. But it would take until the late 1960s and 1970s, 
marked by the publication of Apel’s Peirce studies and Habermas’ adoption of the resulting 
perspective, before the implications of this complex relationship would become visible. 
 
Morris: pragmatics 
Charles Morris turned to Peirce’s work at a time when the philosophy of language, within the 
framework of the development of analytical philosophy, had passed its syntactic phase and was in 
the process of articulating its semantic phase which, in turn, corresponded to the logical-positivist 
phase in the philosophy of science. On the basis of the appropriation of Peirce’s pragmatism and 
semiotic theory of the threefold sign-relation, he was able in parallel with the later Wittgenstein to 
take the innovative step of opening the third phase by adding what he called ‘pragmatics’ to the 
previous two phases. Whereas the first phase was exemplified by the early Wittgenstein’s concern 
with logical form or syntax and the second by Tarski and Carnap’s logical-semantic frameworks, 
pragmatics referred to the active, concrete process of ‘semiosis’ (1938: 3) in the sense of the 
generation, communication, reception and acting upon information and meaning. Instead of 
structure or meaning, the focus thus shifted to the actual use of language. In his main work, Morris 
went beyond the syntactics-semantics-pragmatics subdivision of the earlier book to investigate 
‘semiotic’ in terms of the nature of signs, situated signification processes and ‘formators’ and 
‘formative discourse’ shaping such processes (1946: 153). The fact that his work was published 
under the auspices of the positivist programme for the unification of science, however, accounts for 
the constraint that enforced a narrowing of his perspective. Semiotics in general and pragmatics in 
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particular were explicitly conceived from a behaviouristic perspective which stresses the 
disinterested observation of external behaviour at the expense of attending to the actor, the 
interpreter and their sociocultural context. 
 
Wittgenstein, Winch and Searle: language-games, rule following and speech acts 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1968: paragraph 7) concept of ‘language-games’ was his attempt to capture 
the use people make of language in specific situations – i.e., pragmatics – within the context of a 
form of life of which there is a plurality. While he, like Morris, also tended toward a behaviouristic 
emphasis on custom, training and lack of reflexivity, however, Winch and Searle went some way 
toward redressing this inadequacy by their contributions to pragmatics. Peter Winch offered an 
influential interpretation of Wittgenstein that focused on the concept of ‘following a rule’ (1959: 25), 
with rules being available as a priori forms of life or conceptual understanding. This is indeed an 
explicit conception of the form of practices, yet it suffers from being confined to the ‘conventions’ 
(1959: 181) of particular closed language-games. John Searle broke through this particularistic 
barrier by putting forward an institutional theory of the performance of speech acts as realizations 
of the ‘conventions’ of any one of a range of particular languages – e.g. English, French or German – 
all of which are underpinned by ‘the same underlying rules’ (1965: 39). Being both convention- and 
rule-governed implies that a speech act has ‘formal features which admit of independently study’ 
(1965: 17). These features are by no means restricted only to a particular conventional form, but 
simultaneously also take a rule-like or universal pragmatic form. And Searle insisted that 
participation in such universal rule systems entails ‘a committed use of words’ (1965: 198) and, 
hence, reflexivity beyond custom and tradition. 
 
In Winch and Searle we thus see a progressive shift from a behaviouristic to a formal type of 
pragmatics which Apel and Habermas would later make fully transparent – Apel (1981), for example, 
using his own well-established ‘transcendental-pragmatics’ in a critique of Morris’ behaviourism. 
 
Apel: transcendental-pragmatics 
It is on the basis of his early study of Heidegger’s replacement of Kant’s unhistorical transcendental 
presuppositions by existentialia or temporal principles of human existence which shifted the 
attention to the ‘fore-structure’ or pre-understanding shaping the relation to the world that Karl-
Otto Apel (1973: 24) arrived at his understanding of the basic structures of the human form of life as 
‘quasi-transcendental’. No long after, however, he discovered Peirce’s much earlier and more 
thorough-going semiotic transformation of Kant’s rigid consciousness-based transcendental 
philosophy. This discovery, supplemented by his investigation of the development of the philosophy 
of language from an emphasis on syntax via semantics to pragmatics, prompted him to adopt 
‘transcendental-pragmatics’ as the title of his own philosophical position. Apel’s (1967/70, 1995) 
seminal Peirce studies not only played a key role in kick-starting the renaissance of pragmatism, but 
they also had a formative impact on his collaborator, colleague and friend Habermas (1979: 1-68) 
who chose the parallel title of ‘universal-pragmatics’, later renamed ‘formal-pragmatics’. It is at this 
juncture that the relations or cross-currents between pragmatism and pragmatics for the first time 
became palpable. 
 
By having made the unjustly neglected founder of pragmatism, Peirce, the centre of attention and 
having unearthed the quasi-transcendental Kantian assumptions exhibited by his combination of the 
pragmatic maxim with a scheme of categories, Apel effectively highlighted what I earlier called the 
metaproblematic of pragmatism: that pragmatism, supplemented by pragmatics, concerns action 
that is accompanied by a concurrent reflexive directing and guiding understanding of the very form 
of such action. Peirce understood the process of the interrelation of action and form in terms of 
semiosis in the sense of the sign-mediated process of the generation and signification of information 
and meaning that is intelligible and thus interpretable by others. Mead, Dewey and Mills had already 
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taken the step of thematizing such semiosis in terms of symbolic social and political communication, 
but it is the introduction of pragmatics that made possible its analysis in terms of the use of 
language in specific situations, language games, forms of understanding, speech acts and 
accompanying formal features such as conventions or institutions and formal rule systems. 
Pragmatics thus allowed not only the internal articulation of pragmatism in terms of its two major 
reference points, action or practices and the forms of such engagements, but also the generalization 
of those features to a more complex level – for example, taking the illocutionary binding force of 
speech acts to public discourse and following how learning in specific situations gives rise to 
constitutive and regulative forms. Leaning on Apel, Habermas advanced this process. 
 
Habermas: universal or formal pragmatics 
As early as 1968, Jürgen Habermas (1972) drew on his insight into Peirce’s pragmatist linking of 
action and form to analyse the different types of empirical-analytical, interpretative and critical 
social science in terms of the transcendental framework each presupposes – the mode of 
engagement relative to a particular kind of problem and the type of knowledge aimed at on the 
basis of the relevant cognitive interest. But it was when he, inspired by Apel, developed his universal 
or formal pragmatics that he took his most decisive step. While there is a widespread empirical view 
of pragmatics as the use of language in specific situations, for instance the object of conversation 
analysis, Habermas (1979: 1-68) started from the assumption, not unlike Searle, that such use has 
universal or formal features which can be studied in their own right. His formal-pragmatics 
represents the extrapolation and articulation of exactly those features. According to it, the most 
basic formal-pragmatic categories are the three objective, social and subjective world concepts 
presupposed by all experience, thought, action and interaction. And to these worlds correspond the 
validity principles of truth, rightness and truthfulness respectively which are introduced into action, 
interaction and social relations and given effect there through the implicit or explicit discursive 
raising and acceptance of validity claims. 
 
The next step for Habermas was to restate social theory from the formal-pragmatic perspective in 
his major sociological work, The Theory of Communicative Action (1984/87). While there are 
different kinds of speech acts that through validity claims bring the formal presuppositions or 
universal pragmatic forms into play in concrete situations, Habermas singled out the illocutionary 
type carrying ‘communicative action’ (1984: 94-101) as the sociologically central one. As regards 
form, he treated ‘the lifeworld’ (1987: 119-52) as being complementary to communicative action, 
which implies that the lifeworld encapsulates the form of action. It is quite a complex concept. That 
it is conceived in both a situation-immanent and a situation-transcendent manner is confirmed by 
Habermas’ (1992: 103) later introduction of the concept of ‘immanent transcendence’. On the one 
hand, the lifeworld embraces immanent personality structures and social and cultural institutions or 
conventions and, on the other, it has what could be regarded as a transcendent, meta-conventional, 
meta-cultural dimension which harbours the three formal-pragmatic world concepts and their 
phenomenologically specified validity principles. Validity claims have a concretizing pragmatic 
mediating role between these two levels by drawing on the formal, ideal, ought validity of such 
principles as truth, rightness and truthfulness in order to stimulate and shape the formation of the 
social validity of particular norms and values or conventions relevant to the given situation. From the 
current perspective, it is significant that in a late work Habermas (2003: 8) gave his thought the 
philosophical backing of a theory of knowledge which he calls ‘Kantian pragmatism’. 
 
As in the case of Apel, then, we see that Habermas developed a philosophical-sociological position 
that theoretically drew basic insights from pragmatism and pragmatics and their interrelations. The 
pragmatist relational complex of action and form is given central place and it is then articulated in 
sociological detail by means of expanded ideas deriving from pragmatics. Apel and Habermas’ 
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seminal contribution did not remain without consequences for sociology, but the same can of course 
be said also of pragmatism in general. 
 
 
5 Contemporary Sociological Appropriations of Pragmatism-Pragmatics 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology 
It is apparent from De la Justification (1991) that Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot did not derive 
their pragmatic sociology, as it has come to be called, from the tradition of pragmatism running from 
Peirce to James, Mead and Dewey. And although a chapter heading reads ‘Toward a Pragmatics of 
Reflection’ (Vers une pragmatique de la réflexion) devoted to a look back at their own work, there is 
no sign that they have any connection with the tradition of pragmatics either. Despite all this, 
however, there is no doubt that they follow in the slipstream of pragmatism. What confirms this 
above all is the core concern of their sociology of the critical and justificatory practices of the 
ordinary members of society: the relation of practices to the diverse forms giving shape to them. 
This much is incontrovertible if one assesses their work from the perspective of the metaproblematic 
of pragmatism. But it is also confirmed by their display of other pragmatist hallmarks, such as an 
approach focusing on the ‘situation’ (1991: 11) and the model of ‘discord’ (1991: 270) or dispute 
which starts from a breakdown or problem and ends with the re-establishment of agreement. They 
trace their concern in that context with the problem of general concepts or ‘forms of generality’ 
(formes de généralité) (1991: 20) neither to the pragmatists nor to Kant, but rather to Rousseau’s 
concept of the general will and Durkheim’s concepts of collective consciousness and society. 
Remarkably, Boltanski and Thévenot do not register that Kant developed Rousseau position and that 
Durkheim owed much to Kant. Having started from Rousseau, it is obvious not only why they turn to 
an extensive study of political philosophy in order to draw concepts of forms of generality or the 
common good from it, but also why they failed to see, when they felt compelled to supplement the 
moral aspect by adding the technological and the aesthetic ones, that Kant had already gone beyond 
Rousseau’s exclusively political focus in exactly this manner with his three critiques. The question 
here, however, is how precisely Boltanski and Thévenot conceive of what they call ‘forms of 
generality’ – a particularly pressing one since they are not nominalists. Do they maintain the two-
level conception of situation-bound and situation-transcendent forms, as suggested by Peirce, or do 
they accept the more limited conception of strictly situation-bound forms, as forcefully defended for 
example by Dewey? 
 
From their analytical framework it is apparent that Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach has three 
major dimensions. In keeping with the practices-form relation it incorporates a ‘general/particular’ 
axis (1991:188). Second, on the particular extremity are located a plurality of actors possessing a 
reflexive and critical competence and engaging in practices and, on the general one, are a plurality of 
forms of generality. These forms are conceived as the ‘grammar’ (1991: 33, 177) of a properly 
organized human socio-political order. They are referred to by a variety of names, including 
particularly ‘order of worth’ (ordre de grandeur) (1991: 99), but also ‘common goods’, ‘principles of 
justice’, ‘principles of equivalence’ and ‘principles of order’. At times, the authors’ intention is 
apparently to distinguish between the ‘orders of worth’ and the principles, as when they more fully 
describe the latter in terms of ‘a higher common principle’ (principe supérieur commun) (1991: 33) 
possessing a constraining significance. So, for instance, they see the principles playing a role by 
securing justifications in disputes through which an agreement is forged about the attribution of 
different degrees of worth to the persons involved. But even beyond the series of principles relative 
to the plurality of orders of worth they also identify a few still more general principles of legitimacy. 
The third dimension is occupied by things and objects of different kinds, depending on which types 
of practices and forms they correspond to, which consolidate and lend an objective existence to 
distinctive worlds. It seems that what these things and objects are could most conveniently be 
Strydom, ‘Cross-Currents of Pragmatism and Pragmatics: A Sociological Perspective on Practices and Forms’, IBA Journal 




identified with reference to the institutional complex relevant to a world. Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991: 200-62) distinguish six such worlds each with its own characteristic features. Table 1 below is 
a partial reconstruction of their view of the six worlds with their associated institutional-object 
dimensions, orders of worth, higher common principles and finally the principles of justice 
constraining all the worlds. 
 
Boltanski and Thévenot exhibit a pronounced concern with the pragmatist metaproblematic of the 
relation between practices and forms and they moreover offer a differentiated approach to its 
treatment. This approach allows them to develop illuminating analyses of different worlds, the 
critical and justificatory practices typical of each world, cross-purposes and conflicts of different 
worlds in particular dispute situations, and processes leading to the closure of disputes. The crucial 
question in the present context concerning pragmatism and pragmatics, however, is what limits 
their particular appropriation of the pragmatic legacy imposes on their sociology. 
 
First of all, it is noteworthy that Boltanski and Thevenot distance their sociology of critique from 
behaviourism, positivism and culturalism. The argument for this is that the human sciences must be 
true to their subject, namely, persons whose identities and justifiable relations presuppose ‘a 
reference to a principle that extends beyond themselves’ (1991: 33). This is a highly commendable 
position which is in line with the pragmatist metaproblematic, but what precisely this principle is and 
what its status amounts to remain rather fuzzy. Indeed, the concept of forms of generality is the 
most central yet the fuzziest part of their work. One gets the distinct impression of authors shuffling 
between the two options played out against one another in the pragmatist debate, whether 
between Peirce and James, Apel and Wellmer or Habermas and Rorty: either a situation-
transcendent principle or a situation-immanent principle. Beyond their gerrymandering, however, 
Boltanski and Thevenot’s appeal to a principle that extends beyond persons is decisively put in place 
by the fact that their project is a sociology of ordinary people’s criticisms and justifications, a 
sociology of critique, which is conceived in opposition to a critical sociology. Not only are all persons 
unrealistically and uncritically assumed to possess the same reflexive and critical competence which 
is developed to exactly the same level and backed by the same level or resources, but all forms of 
generality, whether orders of worth or principles, cannot occupy any other position than strictly only 
within the bounds of a situation. If these forms, while remaining rooted in situations, were to extend 
beyond or transcend situations, then the limits of a sociology of critique would be shattered. 
Whatever the impression they give, therefore, it is not possible for Boltanski and Thevenot to 
entertain the idea of situation-transcendent ideas or principles. It is for this reason that they, by 
contrast with their apparent appeals to transcendent principles, reject the efficacy of transcendental 
rules in favour of the constraints of pragmatic forms and, by extension, confirm – not unlike Winch –
that ‘there is no higher vantage point above any of the worlds, no external position from which the 
plurality of justices could be considered from a distance, as a range of equally possible choices’ 
(1991: 285). But what then is meant by a ‘higher common principle’? It is simply declared a 
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‘convention’, a ‘metaphysical’ entity (1991: 177, 183) that defines the humanity of persons and 
determines or qualifies their value or worth. There is no suggestion of a possible connection with 
evolution or phylogenesis, a topic of interest to the pragmatists. By contrast, ontologically Boltanski 
and Thévenot (1991: 168) insist that what appears in a situation alone counts, while the existence of 
anything else is of no interest. 
 
It is due to the inadequacies and limits of a strictly immanent, situation-bound sociology of critique 
that both Boltanski and Thévenot each in his own way subsequently were moved to undertake 
corrective steps by returning to the project of a critical sociology. 
 
 
Apelian-Habermasian cognitive-pragmatic critical sociology 
An alternative sociological project which draws directly from pragmatism and pragmatics is what 
may be described as the cognitive-pragmatic critical sociology that stems from critical theory as 
represented by Apel and Habermas. It proceeds from the acknowledgement that critical theory and 
pragmatism both derive from the left-Hegelian tradition which the contemporaries Marx and Peirce 
represented at the time of its emergence in the nineteenth century against the background of Kant 
and Hegel (Strydom 2011; Delanty 2013; O’Mahony 2013). A comparison of this alternative version 
of sociology with Boltanski and Thévenot’s shows that there is a significant difference between them 
based on the former’s more thorough appropriation of pragmatism and, indeed, its mastery of the 
cross-currents of pragmatism and pragmatics. 
 
In accordance with Marx and Peirce’s respective detranscendentalized emphases of historically 
accumulated rational potentialities and general concepts as well as Apel and Habermas’ quasi-
transcendental conception of necessary and unavoidable conditions, this alternative sociological 
project adopts a consistent approach to the complex of forms of practices. Rather than wavering and 
gerrymandering, it draws a sharp analytical distinction between general forms like Boltanski and 
Thévenot’s orders of worth and common goods, on the one hand, and universal forms such as 
principles, on the other. By contrast with pragmatic sociology’s confinement of all forms to one 
conventional type, the separation of the universal kind secures the character of the alternative as a 
version of critical theory. The distinction between distinct types of forms is maintained on the basis 
of the key left-Hegelian concept of immanent-transcendence (Strydom 2011) according to which  
universal principles indeed remain rooted in a given situation yet transcend it in the sense of being 
applicable to all situations. From this emanates a coherent grasp of the implied process in which 
practices constructively follow the arrow of time and cognitive-pragmatic forms structurationally go 
against it. As regards the principles, accordingly, far from being conventional, they are meta-
conventional; and far from being purely metaphysical entities, they are meta-cultural outcomes of 
evolution, particularly of the phylogenesis of the human brain and mind (Strydom forthcoming). 
With the last enlargement of the brain some 40,000 years ago, the mind acquired a meta-
representational faculty accompanied by an unprecedented degree of cognitive fluidity or flexibility. 
Universal principles as presuppositions that humans qua humans necessarily and unavoidably make 
are given with this meta-representation and fluidity. As such, they are part of the phylogenetically 
evolved form of the human mind which every normal individual acquires through the process of 
ontogenesis. Irrespective of whether form is phylogenetically common and meta-cultural or 
ontogenetically singular and in the head, therefore, it is a cognitive phenomenon, one that is 
cognitively maintained and activated in concrete situations. 
 
The stark difference in the impact of pragmatism on Boltanski and Thévenot’s pragmatic sociology 
and the Apelian-Habermasian cognitive-pragmatic critical sociology respectively is especially 
apparent in the complex area of forms. This key point, alluded to earlier, cannot be over-
emphasized. While pragmatic sociology confines the different kinds of form – both orders of worth 
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and principles – in a somewhat fuzzy state immanently within the parameters of a situation, 
cognitive-pragmatic sociology by contrast in keeping with the concept of immanent-transcendence 
sees forms operating both immanently and transcendently. On the immanent side, it locates cultural 
models, including Boltanski and Thévenot’s orders of worth and common goods, which are indeed 
structured by transcendent principles but articulate closely in the situation with social models, social 
systems and administrative and organizational units. On the transcendent side, it has a multi-layered 
view of form. Peirce’s three formal-logical categories form the basis, followed secondly by his and 
Husserl’s phenomenological specification of their meaning content and, thirdly, by Habermas’ 
formal-pragmatic scheme of the objective, social and subjective worlds erected on that foundation. 
It should be stressed, however, that Habermas’ formal-pragmatic worlds are in turn sociologically 
radicalised so as to give rise to ‘the cognitive order of society’ which contains the cognitive-
pragmatic forms functioning as the constitutive principles of any and every situation in so far as it is 
a human situation and, therefore, has some degree of rationality in it, irrespective of whether 
subjective, social or objective rationality (Strydom in press). 
 
The comparison of Figure 2 with Table 1 above should make the marked difference between the two 
approaches, notwithstanding their shared pragmatic core, graphically apparent. This decisive 
difference determines the form of their respective modes of analysis. Pragmatic sociology takes the 
quite arbitrarily chosen six worlds as the basic elements that must be analysed in their conflictual 
and reconciled relations in order to understand the constitution of a situation and the practices 
transpiring in it. Cognitive-pragmatic sociology, by contrast, does not take substantively defined 
worlds as the most important form elements but, adopting a cognitive perspective, breaks down 
such totalities by shifting the attention to the constitutive and regulative role of the multiplicity of 
meta-level principles of the cognitive order. On this basis, an investigation is conducted of the 
competitive combination of a selection of these principles in practical contexts where cultural 
models at a lower level incorporating values and norms also structure and regulate practices (e.g. 
Strydom 2012; O’Mahony 2013). Further, instead of obviating the need to consider actors by 
treating them all as in principle equal, as does pragmatic sociology, cognitive-pragmatic sociology 
carefully considers the relevant range of cognitively, socially and culturally different actors and 
agents. On the whole, then, the arbitrary theoretical fixing of the analytical perspective beforehand 
by a conception of worlds is avoided by employing a more flexible theoretical approach. And 
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simultaneously the perspective is also broadened beyond the situation in order to provide both 
meta-cultural and natural ontological footholds for normative and explanatory critiques respectively 




In this article, an attempt was made to clarify the relations between pragmatism and pragmatics. 
The argument was that pragmatism is a concern with practices and the forms shaping them, while 
pragmatics is an articulation empirically of the unfolding of form-guided practices and/or formally of 
the pragmatic forms as such. Engaging in the world and undertaking generative practices are of 
great importance, but it is their deployment in and through processes reflexively directed and 
guided by pragmatic forms of different levels and scales that attracts special attention. Lower level 
conventional pragmatic forms that can be found within particular situations are complemented by 
meta-level forms that are rooted in situations, transcend any and every particular situation, and 
work back in a structuring and regulative way on situations. The analysis of such pragmatic forms can 
on the one hand be given formal-logical and philosophical support and, on the other, be 
sociologically sharpened by mobilizing the principles of the meta-cultural cognitive order of society 
while keeping their phylogenetic origin in mind. 
 
The crucial theoretical point made by the argument, however, concerns the significance of the 
orientation toward cognitive-pragmatic forms. It presents itself in two distinct versions: an 
orientation toward conventions, or convention-reflexivity, and an orientation toward principles, of 
principle-reflexivity. Pragmatic sociology restricts itself to convention-reflexivity even when it 
mentions principles. Ideally, however, an adequate sociological approach informed by pragmatism 
and pragmatics should combine both convention- and principle-reflexivity. This is the aim of 
cognitive-pragmatic sociology. 
 
The real thrust of the article, however, is the practical insight that the urgent challenge of our 
troubled times is precisely the recovery of the orientation toward cognitive-pragmatic forms, not 
only in our renewed understanding of sociology, but also in our own ordinary everyday practices and 
those of others whom we study sociologically. 
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